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ABSTRACT
Security is a major concern for organizations who wish to leverage
cloud computing. In order to reduce security vulnerabilities, public
cloud providers oer rewall functionalities. When properly cong-
ured, a rewall protects cloud networks from cyber-aacks. How-
ever, proper rewall conguration requires intimate knowledge of
the protected system, high expertise and on-going maintenance.
As a result, many organizations do not use rewalls eectively,
leaving their cloud resources vulnerable. In this paper, we present a
novel supervised learning method, and prototype, which compute
recommendations for rewall rules. Recommendations are based
on sampled network trac meta-data (NetFlow) collected from a
public cloud provider. Labels are extracted from rewall congura-
tions deemed to be authored by experts. NetFlow is collected from
network routers, avoiding expensive collection from cloud VMs, as
well as relieving privacy concerns.
e proposed method captures network routines and dependen-
cies between resources and rewall conguration. e method
predicts IPs to be allowed by the rewall. A grouping algorithm is
subsequently used to generate a manageable number of IP ranges.
Each range is a parameter for a rewall rule.
We present results of experiments on real data, showing ROC
AUC of 0.92, compared to 0.58 for an unsupervised baseline. e
results prove the hypothesis that rewall rules can be automatically
generated based on router data, and that an automated method can
be eective in blocking a high percentage of malicious trac.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud security introduces unique opportunities as well as chal-
lenges, and is the top concern for organizations who wish to lever-
age the public cloud for their core business infrastructure [7, 15].
While most security breaches can be prevented by proper congu-
ration [5, 9], the need for highly-customized congurations makes
it prohibitively expensive for many organizations to remain pro-
tected over time [4]. is is of increasing importance as large-scale
computing is commoditized by the cloud, enabling organization to
deploy advanced architectures.
A network endpoint which consists of a Virtual Machine (VM)
and an open port, is the gateway to the organization’s virtual net-
work (VNet). Endpoints allow the VNet to communicate with other
resources and users. Unfortunately, endpoints might allow ma-
licious intenders to gain access and compromise network assets.
In response, cloud providers allow control over endpoint access,
using a rewall. e rewall has a list of allowed IP addresses
and protocols. Yet, by default, most public cloud providers allow
endpoints be accessed from any IP [2, 11]. Most of these endpoints
remain with default conguration, because creating and managing
white-lists is dicult: IP addresses change, and a misconguration
Figure 1: Recommendation Scenario
Benign and malicious IPs aempt to communicate with a cloud
endpoint. e recommender learns malicious and benign paerns,
and generates a proper conguration.
can result in a broken service. Figure 1 shows an illustration of the
recommendation scenario.
Automatic conguration and maintenance of rewall rules has
been the subject of extensive research. Existing methods focus
on capturing routine network usage with unsupervised methods,
such as association rule mining applied on rewall logs[14], and
network trac logs[1, 8]. Capturing routine usage is also addressed
in [12, 16], where formulation and methods are proposed in order
to nd models which reect network state. In contrast to our ap-
proach, previous work produces rewall rules from data of a single
resource (losing dependencies between resources). To the best of
our knowledge, this work is the rst to introduce a supervised ap-
proach to rewall rules generation. is enables us to automatically
lter out malicious intenders and scanners which might be allowed
by previous methods. Also, we use trac from network routers,
which enables us to produce recommendations without the need to
collect rewall logs from each machine.
Recommender systems have become very successful at predict-
ing user-item interactions [13]. Despite their signicance, few
recommendation systems have been proposed for cyber-security.
Automated recommendations reduce the expertise level and main-
tenance costs required to manage security, while minimizing the
chances of system interruption. One such example is [10], where
the suggested system provides a list of actions to improve network
security, including rewall updates. However, the system does not
generate a full rewall conguration from scratch.
In this paper, we present a novel cyber-security recommenda-
tion system which generates a list of IP ranges as recommenda-
tions for an access white-list for network endpoint rewalls. e
system learns from existing white-list conguration authored by
cyber-security experts, and predicts the IP ranges to be allowed for
uncongured endpoints.
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2 ALGORITHM
2.1 Dataset
Our dataset is sampled network trac (NetFlow) from a cloud
provider’s routers in IPFIX format [3], collected over three weeks.
e sampling ratio is one every four thousand packets. Each raw
sample represents a trac owwhich consists of: timestamp, source
and destination IPs and ports, direction, protocol and TCP ags.
We refer to IPs that communicate with an endpoint as remote IPs.
Each sample describes communication between an endpoint and a
remote IP. e processing of ow aributes into sample features is
discussed in Section 2.2. In total, we have a lile over 10 million
samples corresponding to 250TB of data.
Endpoints are matched to their rewall conguration. We ob-
serve that about 5% of endpoints are manually congured, overrid-
ing the default (allowing all communication). We assume that these
endpoints are congured by domain experts. is assumption was
veried with a sample of authors. Samples corresponding to these
endpoints are considered labeled data, where a sample is labeled
positive if the remote IP is allowed and negative otherwise.
2.2 Feature Extraction
Our model aims to distinguish between benign and malicious net-
work trac, learning from the labeled trac described in Section
2.1 (5% of the entire dataset). To capture the characteristics of a
remote IP’s behavior, we use features that fall into three categories:
(1) e distribution of communication over time, which consists of
the percentage of inactive hours, average, maximum and standard
deviation of daily and hourly communication volume; (2) e type
of trac, which consists of percentage of incoming and outgoing
TCP ags (Syn, Reset, Fin). ese ags are sent when a communica-
tion ow has started or ended. Hence, they provide a good indicator
to the number of new connections established; (3) e breadth of
communication, which consists of: number of VMs communicating
with the remote IP, and the number of ports used. We also use a
combination of these features by applying a quadratic polynomial
kernel. Table 1 provides a full feature list.
For every remote IP, each feature is computed at four dierent
levels: (1) entire cloud; (2) organization; (3) VM; and (4) endpoint.
e dierent levels allow the model to learn complex dependen-
cies between the communication routine of a remote IP with an
organization’s environment, and its interactions with the cloud.
For intuition on the importance of using dierent levels, consider
the breadth category. High feature values imply that the remote IP
is communicating withmany dierent VMs, using various ports and
dierent protocols. For feature levels 2-4, this means the remote IP
is strongly related to an organization’s deployment, thus provides
a good indicator that it should be allowed. In contrast, for level 1 it
means the remote IP communicates with many cloud deployments
and organizations, which is a good indicator of automatic scanning
that should be denied.
2.3 Learning Models
e cost of denying a remote IP due to misclassifying can be high.
If a remote IP communicates heavily with an endpoint, misclassi-
cation can break a service. erefore, a key modeling challenge is
weighting misclassication.
Algorithm 1 IP Grouping.
Sub procedures are described in Sub Procedure 2
1: input 1: p1, . . . ,pN - authorized IPs
2: input 2: L - max number of prex sets
3: input 3: S - max prex set size
4: output: a cover which satises denition 3.1
5: procedure FindMinCover(p1, . . . ,pN ,L, S)
6: A0, j ← 0 ∀0 ≤ j ≤ L
7: Ai,0 ←∞ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N
8: for i ← 1 to N do
9: for j ← 1 to L do
10: s ← arдmink≤i s .t .
11: |shared pre f ix set o f pk ,pi | ≤ S
12: Ai, j ←∞
13: for k ← s to i do
14: I ← shared pre f ix set o f pk ,pi
15: x ← noise(I )
16: if Ai, j > x +Ak−1, j−1 then
17: . update for i points, j prex sets
18: Ai, j ← x +Ak−1, j−1 . min noise
19: Bi, j ← k . rst authorized IP in I
20: Ci, j ← I
21: PrintCover (A,B,C) . iterate backwards to print results
To overcome this challenge we dene a remote IP’s importance,
with respect to an endpoint, as the relative ratio of its communi-
cation with the endpoint. We weight each sample by the remote
IP’s importance, forcing the model to focus its aention on high
importance remote IPs.
We observe that the negative labeled samples (IPs to deny) rep-
resent 3% of labeled samples described in Section 2.1, and only 5%
of the total number of trac ows accounted for by the labeled
samples. is is due to the noisy nature of IP communication, en-
hanced by the exposure of the public cloud to automatic scanners.
Scanners may be legitimate, like crawlers, or malicious intenders
such as vulnerability scanners. To compensate for the very skewed
nature of our classes, we normalize the weights of samples in each
class by the total class weight.
We devise two recommendation methods, the rst is used as a
baseline.
2.3.1 Baseline. e model collects a list of all remote IPs that
communicate with a given endpoint in the three weeks learning
period (the entire dataset), and predicts ”allow” if and only if an IP is
in that list. Due to the underlying sampling of our dataset described
in Section 2.1, it is most likely that these IPs communicated with
the endpoint many times. is model is unlikely to block routine
communication, but it is prone to allow malicious intenders.
2.3.2 SVM Classifier. We use a binary Support Vector Machine
(SVM) with a quadratic polynomial kernel to learn a weight vector
for our features, described in Section 2.2, and predict our labels,
described in Section 2.1. e classier is then applied on each
instance consisting of an endpoint and remote IP, to predict whether
or not the IP should be allowed access to the endpoint.
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Figure 2: IP Grouping Example for 3-Bit IP Addresses
Possible recommendations forW = {011, 101, 110, 111}. A cover
with zero noise is presented in blue, and a best possible cover by
two prex sets is presented in purple.
3 IP GROUPING
When producing a white-list, ranges are easier to comprehend and
maintain than single IPs. Furthermore, ranges provide more gener-
alization which improves our recommendation by allowing small
uctuations in the IP address. We therefore devise a grouping algo-
rithm using a dynamic programming approach, which transforms
a list of IPs into CIDR formated [6] IP ranges. e CIDR format is
comprised of a base IP address and a number of least signicant
bits, that can vary within the range. An IP is covered by the range
if by neglecting the specied number of least signicant bits, it
is the same as the base IP. e goal of our algorithm is to nd
ranges which cover all IPs classied to be allowed, whilst keeping
the number and size of these ranges as small as possible. Running
the algorithm multiple times with dierent constraints results in a
congurable recommendation, allowing an organization to decide
whether to emphasize reduced aack surface, or manageability
and generalization. Section 4 describes an experiment using the
algorithm on real data.
Sub Procedure 2 IP Grouping
1: procedure PrintCover(A,B,C)
2: if AN ,L = ∞ then
3: f ailed . impossible constraints
4: else
5: i ← N
6: j ← L
7: while i > 0 do
8: print Ci, j
9: i ← Bi, j − 1
10: j ← j − 1
3.1 Problem Statement
Let D be the set of natural numbers from 0 to 232 in their binary
representation. D represents all possible V4 IP addresses. We dene
authorized IPs as those classied to be white-listed. Denote D ⊃
W = {p1, . . . ,pN } the subset of all N authorized IPs, and pi ∈W
the i’th authorized IP.
Given a bit string of length ≤ 32 denoted d , we dene a prex
set I ⊂ D to be the set of IPs which share d as their most signicant
bit prex. We say that I is generated from d . e noise of I is |I \W |,
which corresponds to the number of unauthorized IPs that share
d as their signicant bit prex. e prex notation of a I is its bit
prex d , followed by * to account for bits that can vary within the
set. Given two prex sets, their shared prex is the longest shared
substring of their most signicant bit prexes. eir shared prex
set is the prex set generated from their shared prex. For example,
consider a 5-bit version of D. LetW = {11000, 11001}. Let I1 be the
prex set of IP addresses with the prex ”110”, and I2 be the prex
set of IP addresses with the prex ”111”. e prex notation of I1
is ”110*”, its size is 4 and its noise is 2. e shared prex of I1, I2
is ”11”, and their shared prex set is the prex set of IP addresses
with the prex ”11”.
Finally, we dene a cover C to be a set of pairwise disjoint m
prex sets Ii , i.e C = {I1, . . . , Im }, which satisesW ⊂
mcupdottext
i=1
Ii . We
dene it’s noise as
m∑
i=1
|Ii \W |.
Denition 3.1. GivenW = {p1, . . . ,pN } authorized IPs, L max-
imum number of prex sets, and S maximum prex set size, our
objective is to nd a cover C which satises:
minimize noise(C)
subject toW ⊂
mcupdotdisplay
i=1
Ii , ∀Ii ∈ C
|Ii | ≤ S , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m
m ≤ L
3.2 e Grouping Algorithm
e IP Grouping method (Algorithm 1) uses dynamic programming
to nd the solution to objective function in Denition 3.1. e
key to the algorithm is the following: aer each iteration i, j, Ai, j
holds the minimum noise to cover at least the rst i authorized
IPs, by cover length ≤ j, with prex set sizes ≤ S . For each i, j,
the FindMinCover procedure in Algorithm 1 iterates trough the
dierent possibilities of adding the i’th IP to an existing cover of
j − 1 prex sets and i − 1 IPs. Hence, by assuming that the smaller
covers that were computed in previous iterations are minimal, we
are guaranteed to nd the minimum cover in each new iteration.
Furthermore, aer the last iteration we have a minimum cover for
all N authorized IPs, which satises our objective function.
e run time complexity of the algorithm is O(N × L × S). In
practice, the number of prex sets is limited by the number of rules
allowed in the rewall which is typically small [2, 11]. Furthermore,
the maximum prex set size is also kept small to avoid large ranges
(see Section 4). Hence, in practice the run time complexity of the
algorithm is O(N ).
3.3 A Short Example
Consider a simplied case of a 3-bit version of D:
D = {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111}.
LetW = {011, 101, 110, 111}. For simplicity, let L = 4 and S = 8.
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Figure 3: ROC Curve
Liner SVM, Polynomial SVM and the Baseline ROC curves.
Lines 2-19 of FindMinCover (Algorithm 1) produce the matrices:
A =

0 0 0 0 0
∞ 0 0 0 0
∞ 6 0 0 0
∞ 5 2 0 0
∞ 4 1 0 0

,B,C =

. . . . .
. 1, 011 1, 011 1, 011 1, 011
. 1, ∗ 2, 101 2, 101 2, 101
. 1, ∗ 2, 1∗ 3, 110 3, 110
. 1, ∗ 2, 1∗ 3, 11∗ 3, 11∗

Using procedure PrintCover of Sub Procedure 2 with these matri-
ces, we get a minimum cover {11∗, 101, 011} with noise = 0. By
initializing j to the maximum number of prex sets wanted L′ ≤ L
instead of L, one can get every minimum cover for L′ ≤ L. By
summing over the entries of A, one can get the noise of that cover.
For example, seing i ← 2 we get a minimum cover {1∗, 011} with
noise = 1. Figure 2 shows these covers as leafs of a binary tree. e
reader will notice that the number of rules has become manageable.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
We start by comparing the results of our baseline and SVM classier
described in Section 2.3, based on hypothesis validation. We use
60% of our labeled data set for learning, 20% for parameter search
of the SVM regularization term and 20% as a holdout set for nal
evaluation. Note that these percentages are as a part of the labeled
data set described in Section 2.1. For each remote IP and endpoint in
the holdout set, the trained model predicts whether a domain expert
would have included the remote IP in the endpoint’s white-list. We
then compare the prediction with the known rewall conguration.
To measure the performance, we use AUC over a weighted ROC
curve. e samples are weighted as described in Section 2.3, and
result in a balance between the classes of IPs that should be allowed
and denied. e rewall generation task requires both a high true
positive rate which correspond to allowing access to authorized IPs,
and a high true negative rate which correspond to denying access
from unauthorized IPs. Hence, the AUC metric over a ROC curve is
a good measure for the success of our model. We measure an AUC
of 0.92 for our polynomial SVM model, compared to 0.58 for our
baseline model. Hence, our model provides an improvement of 0.34
in the AUC metric. e improved AUC is a result of learning the
features of white-listed remote IPs as opposed to allowing access to
remote IPs that historically accessed the endpoint. Figure 3 shows
an ROC curve comparison of the baseline model, a linear SVM and
Figure 4: Classes separated by the model
Test set class separation, provided by the polynomial SVM.
a polynomial SVM. Figure 4 depicts the separation of classes in the
test set, provided by the score of the polynomial SVM.
For a deeper understanding of the underlying behavior of our
model, we analyze our feature importance. Figure 5 provides in-
sights into the combined importance of features in each level, de-
scribed at the end of Section 2.2. We observe that features in the
entire cloud level are the dominant ones for denying access, while
allowing access can be aributed to a combination of entire cloud,
organization and endpoint level features.
Algorithm 1 is applied to the results of the model, to generate
the nal recommendation. We set L = 200, the default number
of rewall rules allowed by major public cloud providers [2, 11].
In addition, we set S = 4096, which can cover the IP range of a
small Internet Service Provider [6], therefore can almost surly cover
organizational network.
Figure 5: Feature Level Importance
Cells represent the percentage of weight a feature level contributes
to the nal prediction.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we introduced a novel supervised method which rec-
ommends rewall rules for cloud endpoints. Our method combines
learning from rewall congurations created by domain experts
as well as network trac analysis to generate a recommendation
which excludes malicious intenders. Our experiments show that
allowing all remote IPs that frequently interact with the endpoint is
not likely to provide a good estimation of a rewall congured by a
domain expert. is stresses the importance of using new methods
for rewall rule generation for cloud endpoints. In future research,
we plan to adapt the method suggested in this work to produce
recommendations for other security and maintenance issues such
as VPN conguration and VNET architecture.
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A APPENDIX
Table 1: Feature List
Distribution of communication over time
% of inactive hours
max over average of hourly # of packets
average of hourly # of packets
std of hourly # of packets
max over average of daily # of packets
average of daily # of packets
std of daily # of packets
Type of trac
% of TCP packets out of all packets sent
% of SYN TCP packets out of all packets sent
% of RESET TCP packets out of all packets sent
% of FIN TCP packets out of all packets sent
% of TCP packets out of all packets received
% of SYN TCP packets out of all packets received
% of RESET TCP packets out of all packets received
% of FIN TCP packets out of all packets received
Breadth of communication
% of VMs the IP communicates with
# VMs the IP communicates with / # IP packets observed
% of ports the IP uses, out of # of possible ports
% of ports the IP communicates to out of # of possible ports
# ports the IP uses / # IP packets observed
# ports the IP communicates with / # IP packets observed
A list of extracted features. Each feature is computed at four
dierent levels, as described in Section 2.2.
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